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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, state legislatures across the nation have expressed great
interest in Limited Liability Companies (LLCs). 1 The first LLC stat-
ute was enacted by Wyoming in 1984, but interest in the LLC has
burgeoned since 1988, when the Internal Revenue Service indicated
that LLCs would be treated as partnerships for tax purposes.2
Oklahoma adopted its own LLC Act in May of 1992.3
Although this alternative business form's characteristics make it
potentially attractive to many clients, much uncertainty continues to
surround its use. The attractive characteristic of an LLC is that it al-
lows partnership tax treatment and limited liability without the impo-
sition of corporate formalities.4 However, uncertainty still exists as to
basic issues such as how informally LLC's may be structured and still
retain partnership tax status, whether the entity will be subject to
common law doctrines of piercing the corporate veil, whether LLC
interests are securities under the state and federal securities acts, and
numerous other concerns.5
This Comment's purpose is twofold. First, it seeks to educate the
organizer as to the basic characteristics of an LLC and compare it to
other similar business forms. Second, it seeks to address some of the
most central questions that face an LLC organizer: (1) what must be
1. David Ransom, Limited Liability Companies Are on the Rise, TRIAL, May 1993, at 90-
91.
2. Id. See discussion infra part II.A.
3. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000-60 (West. Supp. 1994).
4. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
5. Some of these concerns are whether the full faith and credit clause will force states to
recognize the LLCs' limited liability, whether LLCs may be a bankruptcy debtor, whether LLCs
hold property as a legal person or a juristic person, and whether the LLC may be used as an
organizational vehicle for professions.
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done to ensure partnership tax treatment; (2) how veil-piercing doc-
trines may be applied to LLCs, and (3) how the securities laws will be
applied to LLC interests.
II. To LLC OR NOT TO LLC, THAT Is T=E QUESTION
A. The Characteristics of an LLC
An LLC is created when two or more persons, referred to as
"members," file executed articles of organization with the Office of
the Secretary of State.6 The articles of organization must set forth the
name of the LLC, the date on which it is to dissolve, its purposes, and
other information. 7 Additionally, members may enter into an operat-
ing agreement that governs how the LLC will be managed.8 The LLC
Act, articles of organization, and the operating agreement work to-
gether to give LLCs the following general characteristics.
1. Limited Liability
Limited liability exists when owners are not personally liable for
the business' debts. Instead, liability extends only to the owners' in-
terests in the business. Section 2022 of the Oklahoma Limited Liabil-
ity Act provides that a basic characteristic of an LLC is limited
liability.9 However, as with a corporation, owners could become per-
sonally liable if they personally guaranteed the business' debt or if veil
piercing doctrines are applied.10
2. Continuity of Life
Continuity of life exists when, regardless of the status of a busi-
ness' owners and managers, the organization survives." The
Oklahoma LLC resembles a corporation in that the LLC's default
provision generally provides for continuity of life.' However, like a
partnership, the LLC dissolves upon the happening of an event such
6. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2004 (West Supp. 1994).
7. Id. §§ 2004-05. The articles should also include the address of the LLC's principal place
of business in this state, the name and address of its resident agent in this state, and any other
provisions which the members elect.
8. Id. § 2013.
9. Id. § 2022 ("A person who is a member or manager, or both, of a limited liability com-
pany is not liable for the obligations of a limited liability company solely by reason of being such
member or manager or both.").
10. See infra Part IH(B).
11. REVISED MODEL Busm.ss CORP. Acr § 3.02 (1984).
12. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2037 (West Supp. 1994).
1993]
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as death, bankruptcy, or withdrawal of one of its members, unless the
articles of organization or operating agreement specify otherwise. 13
3. Free Transferability of Interest
Free transferability of interest exists when the business' shares
can be transferred by one owner without the other owners' consent.1 4
The default provisions of the LLC Act place restrictions on the trans-
ferability of members' interests.15 The statute provides that admit-
tance of a new member is allowed only when authorized by the
articles, operating agreement, or written consent of the members.16
4. Centralized Management
Centralization of management occurs when someone other than
the business owners themselves manages the business.' 7 The default
provision of Section 2013 of the Oklahoma LLC Act provides that the
LLC will be managed by or under the authority of one or more man-
agers who may be, but need not be, members.'" Thus, the LLC Act
allows member management, but without the stringent formalities of a
closely held corporation.
5. Pass-Through Tax Treatment
Pass-through tax treatment exists when the profits, gains, and
losses of the business are directly included in the gross income of the
partner or the member.'9 Corporations do not possess pass-through
tax treatment, thereby exposing income to "double taxation" - once
at the corporate level and once when profits are distributed to the
shareholders.20 Thus, pass-through tax treatment avoids double taxa-
tion, leading to direct tax savings. Additionally, if the business is in-
curring losses, pass-through tax treatment will allow the owners to
offset their other personal income with the business' losses.2' The In-
ternal Revenue Service allows LLCs to benefit from pass-through tax
13. Id.
14. REVISED MODEL Busnxss CORP. Acr § 627 (1993).
15. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2033, 2035. (West Supp. 1994).
16. Id.
17. REVISED MODEL Busnwss CORP. Acr § 8.01 (1993).
18. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2013 (West Supp. 1994).
19. I.R.C. § 701-02 (West Supp. 1994).
20. Id. § 1 (imposing a tax on individuals); id. § 11 (imposing a separate tax on corpora-
tions). See also id. § 7701; id. § 61(a)(7).
21. I.I.C. §§ 701-02 (West Supp. 1994).
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treatment, but only if the LLC possesses at least two non-corporate
characteristics. =
B. The LLC Compared to Other Business Forms
On the surface an LLC closely resembles a Sub-Chapter S Corpo-
ration (S-Corp.) or a limited partnership, both of which provide for
limited liability and pass-tlirough tax treatment. However, a closer
look reveals differences in matters such as filing requirements, orga-
nizational composition and structure, and member protection. These
factors should be considered by the organizer when choosing a busi-
ness form.
1. The LLC Versus the S-Corp.
Differences between an LLC and an S-Corp. begin with the re-
quirements for partnership tax treatment. An LLC is afforded pass-
through tax treatment if its organizer structures the LLC to avoid at
least two corporate characteristics.23 Once the LLC possesses this
pass-through tax treatment, it continues to possess this characteristic
without an independent filing requirement.24 An S-Corporation, on
the other hand is afforded partnership tax treatment only by filing an
election statement and shareholder consent with the Internal Revenue
Service. 5
Differences also exist concerning member composition. An S-
Corp. may have from one to thirty-five shareholders.26 An LLC, on
the other hand, must have at least two members, but there is no upper
limit.2 7 Additionally, an S-Corp.'s shareholders may only be natural
persons, whereas LLC owners may be natural persons, partnerships,
limited partnerships, other LLC's, trusts, estates, associations or
corporations.2s
There are also differences in member protection. If the directors
in an S-Corp. retain dividends, choosing not to distribute them to the
shareholders, the shareholders' hands are tied. The shareholders' op-
tions are limited because the shares are not publicly traded; therefore,
22. 'reas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 to 4 (as amended in 1986); Rev. RuI. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
See also infra part In(A).
23. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
24. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2004 (West Supp. 1994).
25. I.R.C. § 1362(a) (West Supp. 1994); I.R.C. § 1372 (West 1988).
26. Id. § 1361.
27. Id.
28. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2004 (West Supp. 1994).
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there is no ready market to sell their shares. Conversely, if the mem-
bers of an LLC are not satisfied with their distributions, they can re-
sign their member status and the LLC must buy back their shares. 29
Restrictions on the capitalization of the S-Corp. may also make
the LLC form more acceptable to an investor. An S-Corp. may only
have one class of stock, but no such limit is placed on LLC interests.3
Thus, an LLC is provided more flexibility in arranging capitalization
for the organization. For example, if a transaction is highly leveraged,
debt can be reclassified as equity, creating an additional class of stock.
If an S-Corp. tried to convert debt to equity, it would create an addi-
tional class of stock and thereby violate one of the requirements for S-
Corp. status. 31
2. The LLC Versus the Limited Partnership
The most obvious distinction between an LLC and a limited part-
nership is that in a limited partnership there must be a general partner
who is subject to personal liability on behalf of the partnership. 2
Only the limited partners are shielded from liability as are the mem-
bers of an LLC.33 However, in order for the limited partners to main-
tain their limited liability, they must not participate in the
management of the partnership.34 Under Oklahoma's version of the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA), limited partners
may engage in management duties, but these duties are limited.35 On
the other hand, all LLC members are protected from personal liability
even if they manage the business' affairs without restrictions.36
Finally, an LLC allocates its debt to all members and allows them
to increase their basis, thereby providing the members with greater
losses and deductions, and yet their limited liability shields the mem-
bers from any personal risk for the debt.37 However, distributing debt
to a limited partner's basis could place him at risk for the debts. Debt
29. Id. § 2027.
30. The LLC Act does not place a restriction on the number of classes of stock. OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000-2060 (West Supp. 1993).
31. See Edward J. Roche, Jr. et al., Limited Liability Companies Offer Pass.Through Bene-
fits Without S Corp. Restrictions, 74 TAx'N 248 (1991).
32. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, § 142 (West 1991).
33. Id. § 320.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. OKI.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2017 (West Supp. 1994).
37. Martha W. Jordan & Peter K. Kloepfer, The Limited Liability Company: Beyond Classi-
fication, 69 TAxEs 203, 204 (1991).
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distribution would cause the basis to be limited to the limited part-
ner's contributed capital plus any net profits therefore the deductions
and losses allowed by these limited partners would be less than with
an LLC.38
III. CONCERNS AND UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING T=E LLC
Even if the LLC form fits a client's needs, an organizer must
avoid pitfalls that could lead to a loss of benefits or to added liabili-
ties. First, LLCs must lack certain corporate characteristics in order to
receive the desired pass-through tax treatment. Second, actions
should be taken to assure that doctrines similar to piercing the corpo-
rate veil will not be applied to the LLC, resulting in personal liability
for its members. Finally, the organizer should determine whether fed-
eral and state securities laws apply to membership interests, thereby
requiring compliance with applicable securities regulations.
A. Taxation and the LLC
1. The Benefits of LLC Tax Treatment
The LLC is a desired form of business largely because of the pre-
ferred tax treatment that it provides to its members. In short, the
LLC provides the limited liability of a corporation or limited partner-
ship and the tax treatment benefits of a general partnership.39 The
tax benefits of the LLC fall into two basic categories: (1) flow through
tax treatment of gains and losses, and (2) preferable allocation of
gains, losses, deductions and credits.
The most obvious tax benefit of the LLC is flow-through tax
treatment. A corporation, although providing limited liability, does
not protect its shareholders from double taxation.' When a corpora-
tion produces income, it is taxed at the corporate level due to its status
as a separate legal entity. Additionally, when the profits of the corpo-
ration are distributed to a shareholder in the form of dividends, the
individual shareholder's gross income increases, so the corporate
owner is taxed again at the shareholder's individual tax rate. An LLC
may allow its owners to escape double taxation by receiving partner-
ship tax treatment-the income is included directly in the individual
partner's income.
38. Id. at 206.
39. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
40. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
1993]
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In addition to the benefits of pass-through tax treatment, LLC
members can receive allocations of gains, losses, deductions and cred-
its from the LLC.41 The concept of allocation is the same as pass-
through treatment of income. That is, since there is no corporate en-
tity, the gains, losses, deductions and credits of the LLC filter directly
to the members.42 Allocation relates to the ability of an owner to
reduce his personal income by subtracting losses or deductions in-
curred by the business.43 The member's distributive share of income,
gain, loss, deduction, or credit is determined by the terms of the oper-
ating agreement.44 If the operating agreement does not provide in
what percentage these items are allocated to the different members,
then they are allocated in accordance with each member's ownership
interest in the LLC.45 However, if by the terms of the operating
agreement an allocation of these items produces a substantial eco-
nomic effect then the terms are disregarded and the items will be allo-
cated by the member's ownership interest in the LLC.46
There are however limitations on the amount of LLC losses that
a member can use to offset his other income.47 Section 704(d) allows
allocation of losses only up to the amount of the member's adjusted
basis.48 This adjusted basis is the amount of money and property ini-
tially contributed to the LLC by the member, as well as any additional
contributions of money or property by the member, increased or de-
creased by the member's share of LLC income or loss plus his share of
debt.49
2. Assuring Preferred Tax Treatment for the LLC
Although the preferred tax treatment given to LLCs may greatly
benefit a client, it is not automatic. The Internal Revenue Service
specifies that in order to qualify for partnership tax treatment there
41. I.R.C. § 702(a)(7) (West Supp. 1994).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 704.
44. Id. § 704(b)(2).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 704(b)(2). The Treasury Regulations have interpreted substantial economic effect
in relation to partnerships. In regard to general partners, there is a substantial economic effect
where upon liquidation of a partnership, the general partner would be liable for the deficit in his
capital account. In regard to limited partners, if it appears that a limited partner's capital ac-
count balance will unexpectedly become negative as a result of an adjustment, allocation or
distribution, such partner will be specially allocated sufficient partnership income and gain to
prevent or eliminate the deficit quickly. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a) (1983).
47. I.R.C. § 704(d) (West Supp. 1994).
48. Id. § 704.
49. Id. § 705.
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must be more noncorporate than corporate characteristics.5 0  Corpo-
rate characteristics include: (1) associates; (2) an objective to carry on
business and divide the gains therefrom; (3) continuity of life, (4) cen-
tralization of management, (5) free transferability of interests, and (4)
limited liability.51 The Regulations state further that characteristics
common to both a partnership and a corporation should not be con-
sidered in determining the organization's status. Since "associates"
and "an objective to carry on a business and divide gains" are charac-
teristics common to both types of entities, the Regulations conclude
that an entity will be taxed as a corporation if the organization pos-
sesses at least three of the last four requirements.
As a result, for an LLC to qualify for partnership tax treatment
the LLC must lack at least two of the last four characteristics.52 The
LLC statute mandates that the LLC owners are afforded limited lia-
bility.53 This means that the trick for the LLC planner is to avoid two
of the following three corporate characteristics: (1) continuity of life,
(2) centralized management, and (3) free transferability of interest.
The organizer is provided great flexibility to avoid the two corporate
characteristics that are least suitable to the client's needs.
a. Avoiding Centralized Management
Centralized management is a corporate characteristic that exists
when any person or group of persons (which does not include all the
owners) has continuing exclusive authority to make management deci-
sions which are necessary to conducting the business for which the
organization was formed.5 4 In the LLC context, appointing or hiring
managers is insufficient to establish centralized management.55 In-
stead, the company must be managed by persons who are not owners
of the LLC.
50. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1)(1983). See also Bo~is I. BrrrKER & JAMES S. EUsICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 2.04, at 2-13 (5th abr.
ed. 1987).
51. reas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1)(1983).
52. See, eg., Rev. RUI. 88-76 (granting partnership tax treatment to a Wyoming LLC that
lacked continuity of life and free transferability of interest).
53. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2022 (West Supp. 1994).
54. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983).
55. See Teas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1983)(treating the general partner's managerial
authority in a limited partnership as similar to the power of a board of directors of a corporation,
even when the limited partners own substantially all of the interest); Zuckman v. United States,
524 F.2d 729,738 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Fla. Ltr. Rul. 9010027 (finding no centralization of management
where members reserved management powers in proportion to their interests in the LLC and
each member could incur liabilities on behalf of the LLC); BrrrKER, supra note 50, at 2.04.
1993]
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It is likely that many organizers of Oklahoma LLCs will opt to
allow its owners to manage the affairs of the business.56 Owner man-
agement provides a close association with business affairs and deci-
sion-making. And in the context of an LLC the member will not face
the possibility of personal liability as would exist in a partnership.57
b. Avoiding Continuity of Life
Continuity of life is present where the organization continues
even when one or more of its owners dies, retires, resigns, or suffers
insanity, bankruptcy, or expulsion.58  Unlike Oklahoma corpora-
tions,59 the default provision of the Oklahoma LLC avoids the charac-
teristic of continuity of life by providing that LLCs dissolve when one
of the following events of disassociation occurs:60
(1) a member withdraws by voluntary act;
(2) a member is removed in accordance with the operating
agreement;
(3) a member assigns all interest in the LLC;
(4) there is majority vote to end the LLC;
(5) there is unanimous consent to end the LLC when the member
makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors;
(6) there is a bankruptcy or reorganization; or
(7) a member dies or becomes incompetent.
The LLC can also be dissolved when the time specified in writing in
the articles of organization or operating agreement expires, or when
events specified in the articles of organization or operating agreement
take place.6' Finally, dissolution occurs when written consent is given
by all members.6'
It should be noted that after dissolution the LLC may actually
continue, yet avoid continuity of life. One way that an LLC may go
on is if the remaining members unanimously consent to continuing the
56. See Sylvester . Orsi, Comment, The Limited Liability Company: An Organizational
Alternative for Small Business, 70 NEB. L. REv. 150, 159-60 (1991).
57. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2016-17 (West Supp. 1994). However, a member or man-
ager is not protected from liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty, where the act or omission
is not in good faith, or where a transaction is for improper personal benefit.
58. freas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1)(1983). See also id. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (providing that
continuity of life will be present when no member has the power to dissolve the organization in
contravention of the agreement).
59. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1096 (West Supp. 1994).
60. Id. § 2037.
61. Id.
62. Id
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business. 63 The second option is to merge the LLC with another
ongoing entity, such as a partnership or shell LLC.64 A merger might
be preferred because it only requires the consent of a majority of the
members.65
c. Avoiding Free Transferability of Interest
Free transferability of interest exists if all members, or those
members owning substantially all of the interests in the organization,
can transfer their interests without the other owners' consent. 66 A
transfer of "interest" confers actual membership upon the transferee,
including voting and management rights, not merely an interest in
profits.67 Obtaining these rights without restrictions, such as consent
to transfer to a third party, constitutes free transferability of interest.
68
Free transferability of interest may be a desirable characteristic since
it provides greater marketability for shares.
The Oklahoma LLC statute provides for restriction of transfera-
bility of interests by allowing an assignee of a membership interest to
become a member only if the articles of organization or operating
agreement provide or if the members consent in writing.69 If the LLC
organizer provides for completely free transferability of interest in the
articles of organization or operating agreement, then this corporate
characteristic is not avoided.70
However, an LLC organizer may attempt to provide some mar-
ketability in order to restrict transferability as little as possible and yet
avoid the "free transferability" characteristic. It is clear that the draft-
ers of the Oklahoma LLC statute had this notion in mind because,
unlike Wyoming's statute, the Oklahoma LLC statute allows the
organizer to restrict transfers by unanimous consent (like Wyoming)
or by mere majority consent.7' Requiring unanimous consent is the
safest way to avoid free transferability of interest.72 For example, in
63. d.; Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (holding that continuation after unanimous con-
sent does not create continuity of life).
64. See OKLA. STAT. AtNN. tit. 18, § 2054 (West Supp. 1994). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.708-
1(b)(2)(i) (1956) (allowing a business with partnership tax treatment - including LLCs - to
merge without losing preferred tax treatment).
65. Oa.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2054 (West Supp. 1994).
66. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1983).
67. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2035 (West Supp. 1994).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701(2)(c)(e) (1983).
71. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2035 (West Supp. 1994).
72. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
19931
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Revenue Ruling 88-76, the IRS held that there is no free transferabil-
ity of interests where a transferee's ability to acquire all attributes of
membership is contingent upon the approval of all remaining mem-
bers.73 Requiring only majority consent for transfer of shares could
be a more desirable restraint, but it is not clear how the IRS will treat
majority consent in the context of the free transferability of interest
characteristic.74
B. Assuring Limited Liability for the LLC
One of the primary objectives of LLC legislation is to provide
entrepreneurs with an alternative business organization that supplies
limited liability.75 Accordingly, the LLC supplies limited liability76
while freeing its members from observing many corporate formali-
ties77 and allowing them to participate in management without losing
limited liability. These benefits, however, may be limited if concepts
similar to piercing the corporate veil are applied to the LLC. Thus,
this section of the Comment raises two important issues: (1) will con-
cepts similar to corporate veil piercing be applied to LLC's, and (2) if
so, how?
1. Will Veil Piercing Concepts Be Applied to LLC's?
The Oklahoma LLC Act provides no language indicating an in-
tent that veil piercing concepts apply.78 On the other hand, the ab-
sence of such a provision may not indicate legislative intent since the
73. Wayne M. Gazur and Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CAsE
W. REs. L. REv. 386, 446 (1991); Robert R. Keatinge, et al., The Limited Liability Company: A
Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375, 427 (1992).
74. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1983); Texas Private Letter Ruling 92-10019 (stating
that Texas' LLCs lack free transferability of interest if transfers are conditioned on the consent
of managers or on the majority of members).
75. Gazur, supra note 73, at 389; Keatinge, supra note 73, at 385.
76. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 2022 (West Supp. 1994) provides a broad-based liability
exemption for managers and members of an LLC stating, "A person who is a member or man-
ager, or both, of a limited liability company is not liable for the obligations of a limited liability
company solely by reason of being such member or manager or both."
77. Under the Oklahoma Limited Liability Company Act, OIUA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,§§ 2000-26 (West Supp. 1994), business formalities that must be observed appear to be limited to
the following: filing of executed and conforming articles of organization with the Secretary of
the State and payment of a filing fee, §§ 2004-2007; maintenance of a registered office and agent
for service of process, § 2010; and maintenance of certain records, § 2021. Other formalities such
as the organization of management, §§ 2013-2015, the allocation of member voting rights,§§ 2014 and 2018, and the allocation of distributions, §§ 2025 and 2026, may be varied by the
terms of the operating agreement or the articles of organization.
78. Unlike Colorado, which statutorily applied the corporate veil doctrine to its LLCs.
CoLO. Rav. STAT. § 7-80-107 (Supp. 1990).
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veil piercing doctrine is a common law theory.79 Indeed, the
Oklahoma General Corporations Act8" makes no mention of piercing
the corporate veil although the theory has been judicially adopted."'
A clue as to the applicability of veil piercing doctrines to LLCs
may be gleaned by comparing the application of that doctrine to other
business forms. The veil piercing doctrine is applied to Oklahoma
corporations but not to limited partnerships. Rather, a limited part-
ner's liability shield depends upon whether he acted like a general
partner or participated in the control of the business.8
The difference between these approaches likely results from an
important structural distinction between the two business forms: all
corporate shareholders are afforded limited liability, but a limited
partnership must have at least one general partner with unlimited lia-
bility.83 Thus, a limited partnership creditor can seek remedy through
the general partner.84 LLCs more closely resemble corporations in
this regard, however, since they bestow limited liability upon all mem-
bers.85 Thus, creditors of the company, whether in contract or tort,
may look only to the assets of the LLC when seeking judicial remedy.
Allowing control to be a basis for imposing personal liability would
conflict with express provisions of the Oklahoma LLC Act. If mem-
bers elect to manage, the Oklahoma LLC Act clearly provides them
limited liability.86
2. Oklahoma Veil Piercing Concepts in the LLC Context
This section will attempt to predict how corporate veil piercing
concepts will be adapted to Oklahoma LLCs. 7 This approach exam-
ines the policies that prompt Oklahoma Courts to pierce the corpo-
rate veil, the evidence that invokes these concerns, and the translation
of these concerns to the LLC context.
79. Keatinge, supra note 73, at 445.
80. OKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1001-1143 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994).
81. See, eg., Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Goforth, 143 P.2d 154 (Okla. 1943).
82. See Keatinge, supra note 73, at 444.
83. Gazur & Goff, supra note 75, at 403.
84. Id.
85. See id.; see also Keatinge et al., supra note 73, at 445. Thus, like a corporation, the LLC
appears to be an entity distinct from the individuals composing it.
86. Compare the unconditional grant of limited liability in OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2022
(West Supp. 1994) with the optional provision of management by membership in OKA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2013, 2015 (West Supp. 1994).
87. Since Oklahoma adopted the Delaware Corporation Statutes, it is unclear whether Del-
aware precedent was likewise adopted. This paper makes no attempt to resolve that issue or to
apply Delaware precedent.
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A corporation is generally considered an entity distinct from its
stockholders.' However, when necessary to prevent fraud, to protect
the rights of third persons, or to accomplish justice, both law and eq-
uity will disregard the corporation as an entity distinct from the per-
sons comprising it.89 Similarly, in Buckner v. Dillard,9° the Court
stated that where a corporation's legal entity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law
will disregard the corporation as an association of persons. 91 Thus, a
corporation is presumed to be a legal entity distinct from the individu-
als composing it unless the legal fiction is used to achieve an improper
purpose.92
Veil piercing considerations thus may be grouped into three
broad categories: (1) alter ego concerns; 93 (2) undercapitalization
concerns; and (3) fraud, illegality or wrongful conduct concerns.94
Each of these categories reflects a view that certain activities should
not be legitimized under the guise of the corporate fiction.95 For the
following reasons, these concerns are largely mirrored in the LLC
context.
88. See, e.g., State ex reL Okla. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Tblsa Flower Exch., 135 P.2d
46,48 (Okla. 1943); Buckner v. Dillard, 89 P.2d 326,329 (Okla. 1939); Chestnut Sec. Co. v. Okla.
Tax Comm'n, 48 P.2d 817, 819 (Okla. 1935).
89. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Goforth, 143 P2d 154, 157 (Okla. 1943). The corporate
fiction may be cast aside not only for the purpose of imputing liability to the shareholder(s) but
also for gaining jurisdiction over a shareholder. An example of the latter situation is where a
plaintiff seeks to have the corporate veil pierced in order to gain personal jurisdiction over a
shareholder using state long arm statutes. See, e.g., Home-Stake Prod. Co. v. Talon Petroleum,
907 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir. 1990). However, the test relating to the amenability of service of pro-
cess and forum does not require as stringent a showing as that required to impute legal liability.
See Rea v. An-Son Corp., 79 F.R.D. 25,31 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Home-Stake, 907 F.2d at 1017-18.
90. 89 P.2d 326 (Okla. 1939).
91. ld. at 329.
92. The Mid-Continent court summarized this view:
The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity, separate and apart from the persons
composing it, is a legal theory introduced for purposes of convenience and to subserve
the ends of justice, but the concept will not be extended to a point beyond its reason
and policy, and when invoked in support of an end subversive of said policy will be
disregarded by the courts.
Mid-Continent, 143 P.2d at 157.
93. See Warner Bros. Theaters v. Cooper Found., 189 F.2d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 1951).
94. Compare HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
Busnwss ENTERPRISES § 146, at 253 (2d. ed. 1970).
95. For a more complete analysis of Oklahoma's treatment of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil, see Kenneth B. Watt, Comment, Piercing the Corporate Vei" A Need for Clarifi-
cation of Oklahoma's Approach, 28 TuLSA L. J. 869 (1993).
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a. LLC Veil Piercing Based Upon Alter Ego Concerns
One circumstance in which courts pierce the corporate veil is
where the corporation is the alter ego of or a mere instrumentality of
the shareholders.9 6 This concern addresses the possibility that credi-
tors will rely on a false belief that they are dealing with either an indi-
vidual shareholder or parent corporation (as opposed to the actual
corporation with whom they are dealing).9 7 Further, if corporate
records are not properly maintained, creditors may be hindered in
their search for assets, and the improper distribution of assets may be
concealed. 98
A number of factors influence a court's decision on whether the
corporation is merely an alter ego or a mere instrumentality. Where
the veil is pierced to the detriment of an individual shareholder, courts
look to whether the corporation is without separate books, does not
have its finances kept separate from the individual's finances, pays the
individual's obligations or vice versa, is not following corporate for-
malities, or is merely a sham.99
Alternatively, where a plaintiff seeks to pierce the corporate veil
to the detriment of a corporate shareholder, the question hinges pri-
marily on control. 1°° To determine if one corporation is merely an
instrumentality of another, courts may consider whether: 1) the par-
ent corporation owns all or most of the subsidiary's stock; 2) the cor-
porations have common directors or officers; 3) the parent provides
financing to its subsidiary; 4) the dominant corporation subscribes to
all the other's stock; 5) the subordinate corporation is grossly under-
capitalized; 6) the parent pays the salaries, expenses, or losses of the
subsidiary; 7) almost all of the subsidiary's business is with the parent
or the assets of the former were conveyed from the latter; 8) the par-
ent refers to its subsidiary as a division or a department; 9) the subsid-
iary's officers or directors follow directions from the parent
corporation; or 10) legal formalities for keeping the entities separate
and independent are observed.'01
96. See, eg., Key v. Liquid Energy Corp., 906 F.2d 500, 503-04 (10th Cir. 1990) (not reach-
ing the question whether under Oklahoma law proof that a subsidiary corporation is a mere
instrumentality or alter ego of its parent corporation is enough to pierce the corporate veil ab-
sent a showing of fraud, illegality, of inequity).
97. Cf. HARvEY GELB, PERSONAL CORoRAra LiABu.rry: A GUIDE FOR PLAN Rs, Lrri-
GrAToRs, AND CEDrrons' COUNSEL § 1.8 (1991).
98. Id.
99. Home-Stake Prod. Co. v. Talon Petroleum, 907 F.2d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1990).
100. Frazier v. Bryan Memorial Hosp. Auth., 775 P.2d 281 (Okla. 1989).
101. Id. at 288.
1993]
15
Wood and Woodruff: The Oklahoma Limited Liability Company
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1993
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
While the exact evidentiary burden concerning these factors is
unclear, courts applying Oklahoma law have developed some guide-
lines. All of the factors need not be shown to convince a court that
one corporation is merely the instrumentality of another corpora-
tion."° Apparently, not all the factors indicative of individual liability
need be shown either." 3 Further, fraud is not a necessary element to
veil piercing.' 4 On the other hand, an entity will not be disregarded
merely because all or a majority of its stock is owned by a single indi-
vidual 0 5 or by a single corporation.0 6 Beyond these guidelines, the
trier of fact is apparently free to weigh the factors on an ad hoc basis.
The rationale underlying alter ego concerns seems equally appli-
cable in the LLC context. An LLC, whether owned individually or by
a legal person, may be operated as the mere instrumentality of its
owner(s). 107 A creditor may then be confused about whom he is deal-
ing with and enter into a transaction with the LLC basing his expecta-
tion of payment upon the member's financial stability. In this
situation there seems no reason to treat the LLC debtor differently
than the corporate debtor. Thus, where the LLC commingles com-
pany and individual funds, improperly converts company revenues to
individual use, causes subsidiaries to turn over all revenue to the par-
ent leaving them essentially judgment proof, or in numerous other
scenarios does not respect the separate identities of the entity and the
equity holder(s), the LLC should receive no more favorable treatment
in the courts than would a corporate debtor.
On the other hand, an LLC member should not experience the
difficulty corporate shareholders do in observing formalities. The
LLC statute provides for little in the way of actual formalities, merely
102. Id.
103. Home-Stake, 907 F.2d at 1018-19.
104. In re Moran Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., 130 B.R. 588, 591 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1991). But
see Home-Stake, 907 F.2d at 1017. The veil piercing test requires "a showing not only that the
corporation is a shell, but that it was used to commit a fraud." Id.
105. See, e.g., Robertson v. Roy L. Morgan, Prod. Co., 411 F.2d 1041 (10th Cir. 1969);
Sautbine v. Keller, 423 P.2d 447 (Okla. 1966); Garrett v. Downing, 90 P.2d 636 (Okla. 1939).
106. See Key v. Liquid Energy Corp., 906 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1990); Rea v. An-Son Corp., 79
F.R.D. 25 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Frazier v. Bryan Memorial Hosp. Auth., 775 P.2d 281, 288 n.35
(Okla. 1989) ("Something more than a community of interest in pursuit of a common end must
be shown before a court of equity will, for the purposes of a given case, strip two corporations of
their distinct personalities and practically blend them into one.").
107. See, eg., In re "Ibreaud, 45 B.R. 658 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1985) (disregarding separate
existence of non-debtor corporations where debtor organized and controlled entities as a front
to raise money for himself and to hinder creditors).
[Vol. 29:397
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requiring the filing of executed and conforming articles of organiza-
tion with the secretary of state and the payment of a filing fee, mainte-
nance of a registered office and agent for service of process, and
maintenance of certain records.108 Thus, it should be difficult for a
plaintiff to assert a veil piercing theory predicated only upon a failure
to follow LLC formalities. 10 9
b. LLC Veil Piercing Based on Undercapitalization
Concerns
Inadequate capitalization may be an important factor in a court's
decision to pierce the corporate veil where the corporation was not
organized with adequate capital for its foreseeable business needs. 110
This concern is especially weighty where the claimant is an involun-
tary creditor such as a tort victim who did not choose to deal with the
corporation and thus had no opportunity to ascertain its financial sta-
bility before dealing with it. A voluntary creditor, on the other hand,
ostensibly has the ability to review the finances of the corporation."'
However, under a given set of facts, this supposition may not be real-
istic.1 2 For example, a trade creditor in a competitive field may have
little practical ability to ascertain whether the corporation is ade-
quately capitalized. 1 3 This difficulty may arise because the corpora-
tion may not want its finances subject to review either because of the
additional cost and trouble"14 or for other reasons. In a competitive
market the corporation may substitute goods or services from other
creditors that do not demand such assurances. Thus, an individual
creditor in a weak bargaining position may not be able to demand
such assurances and remain in business.
These concerns seem equally applicable to LLC creditors,
whether in contract or in tort. A creditor who has no reasonable abil-
ity to review the financial stability of the LLC before interacting with
it should have the same recourse as it would against a corporate
108. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2004-05 (West. Supp. 1994).
109. Cf. Keatinge, supra note 73, at 446.
110. See In re Moran Pipe & Supply Co., 130 B.R. 588 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1991); see also
Home-Stake Prod. Co. v. Talon Petroleum, 907 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir. 1990); Frazier v. Bryan
Memorial Hosp. Auth., 775 P.2d 281 (Okla. 1989); GEBa, supra note 97, § 1.6[1].
111. GELB, supra note 97, § 1.6[2].
112. 1&
113. Cf. ROBERT CHAR.ES CLAR, CORPORATE LAW 76 (1986).
114. Ascertaining the wealth of the corporation or other investors could entail significant
information costs. Cf. GELB, supra note 97, at 68.
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debtor. There seems no reason to treat the LLC differently with re-
spect to inadequate capitalization claims than the corporate debtor
would be treated.
c. LLC Veil Piercing Based Upon Fraud Concerns
Finally, a finding that a corporation operates to commit fraud,
illegality, or wrong upon the public may compel a court to pierce the
corporate veil.115 This situation often arises where the corporation
was initially adequately capitalized but the directors or officers siphon
off the assets through salaries, dividends, or loans, leaving to little to
satisfy creditors. For example, in Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Cim-
maron Exploration Co." 6 the defendant, who was the sole officer, di-
rector, shareholder, and employee of the corporation, was found to be
both the alter ego of the corporation and to have wrongfully diverted
incoming monies, intended to be forwarded to the plaintiffs, to his
personal use.117
This category is ill-defined in Oklahoma but appears to require
less than a showing of actual fraud." 8 Thus, courts are free to give the
word fraudulent a generous reading" 9 and do not restrict its applica-
tion to transfers that are deceptive. Rather, courts also include trans-
fers that are unfair to creditors."2° There is no "great reason to
distinguish between a management's taking value away from share-
holders by lying to them and their taking value away from sharehold-
ers by means of an unfair self-dealing transaction that is fully
disclosed."''
These concerns should apply equally in the LLC context. An un-
dercapitalized LLC should not be allowed to commit fraud upon its
creditors by sheltering profits through member distributions and then
circumventing individual liability by hiding behind the business' iden-
tity. A court would probably not hesitate to look behind the legal
fiction merely because the business is an LLC. Thus, there seems to
be no reason to treat the LLC as a favored child when it uses its legal
fiction for an improper purpose.
115. Buckner v. DUllard, 89 P.2d 326 (Okla. 1939).
116. 564 F.Supp. 840 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
117. Id. at 853-54; see also Selected Inv. Corp. v. Duncan, 260 F.2d 918, 920-21 (10th Cir.
1958).
118. Selected Inv., 260 F.2d at 920.
119. CiARK, supra note 113, at 456.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 457.
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Given the structural similarity between the two business entities,
corporate veil piercing policies generally apply to LLCs. Differences
in the organization of LLCs and corporations may make a difference
in the weighing of veil piercing factors; however, the underlying policy
considerations should remain the same. Thus, courts should look to
corporate veil piercing precedents and adopt a similar rationale for
the LLC.
3. A Final Caveat
Although the preceding discussion has attempted to explicate the
policies and factors that underlie the veil piercing doctrine and its po-
tential application to the Oklahoma LLC, the test in reality is far from
cut and dried. Determining whether certain factors support a veil
piercing theory is a question of fact 22 and requires consideration of
the totality of the evidence.1' 3 No hard and fast rules or definitive
legal standards apply. 24 Moreover, courts are reluctant to pierce the
corporate veil and will do so only in extraordinary circumstances. 25
Thus, each case should be evaluated in accordance with its individual
facts.
C. Securities Regulations and LLC Interests
Courts have not yet addressed whether the securities laws apply
to LLC interests. 126 However, if LLC interests come within the pur-
view of the Securities Act of 1933127 or the Oklahoma Securities
Act,"2 their offer or sale must be accompanied by registration with
the Securities Exchange Commission 129 and/or the Oklahoma Securi-
ties Commission, 30 unless an exemption from registration applies. 3 '
Further, securities status may create substantial disclosure obligations
and subject the issuer to the anti-fraud provisions of the securities
122. Id.; see also Moran Pipe & Supply Co., 130 B.R. 588, 592 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1991).
123. Moran, 130 B.1L at 593.
124. Keatinge, supra note 73, at 444.
125. Id.; see also Selected Inv. Corp. v. Duncan, 260 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1959).
126. Marc I. Steinberg & Karen L. Conway, The Limited Liability Company as a Security, 19
PEPP. L. Rnv. 1105, 1106 (1992).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1988 & Supp IV 1992).
128. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 §§ 1-501 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994). Currently, at least 16
states have filed legal actions against LLC's seeking to enjoin the sale of interests on the grounds
that they are unregistered securities. See John R. Emshwiller, New Kind of Company Attracts
Many - Some Legal Some Not, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1993, at B1.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1988).
130. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 3, 201, 202, 301 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993).
131. For typical exemptions, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d (Supp. 1992); OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit.
71, §§ 2, 401 (West Supp. 1993).
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laws.132 The following analysis addresses the applicability of federal
and Oklahoma securities laws to Oklahoma LLC interests.
1. Federal Securities Law and the Oklahoma LLC
The Securities Act of 1933 does not provide a substantive defini-
tion of the term security.133 Rather, it provides a laundry list of spe-
cific interests that are considered securities. 34 From among these
enumerated interests, "stock" and "investment contract" are the cate-
gories that could cover LLC interests.
At least one commentator, Marc I. Steinberg, has posited that
interests in a LLC may be classified as securities under the Landreth
Timber Company v. Landreth135 analysis of stock as a security.136
Steinberg states that "because LLC interests are issued by an entity
called a 'Company' and the typical issuance of an equity interest by a
commercial enterprise calling itself a company or corporation is stock,
substance should prevail over form, thereby mandating that LLC in-
terests be analyzed pursuant to the ordinary attributes of stock stan-
dard.' 37 Steinberg recognizes that, unlike LLC interests, the interests
in Landreth were actually denoted as "stock," but he nevertheless be-
lieves that the "same or similar characteristics" test may be used to
analyze LLC interests. 38
This conclusion seems doubtful. The Landreth Court noted that
the plain language of the securities act states that "stock" is to be con-
sidered a security within the meaning of those acts. The court went on
to note that the fact that an instrument bears the label "stock" is not
of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the acts. Significantly,
however, the court stated that when an instrument is both called stock
and bears stock's usual characteristics, a purchaser may justifiably as-
sume the federal securities laws apply. The reasons for this conclusion
were specifically outlined:
132. See Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, 19 PHPP. L.
Rnv. 1069, 1071 (1992).
133. Id. at 1081.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (Supp. 1993). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also contains a
list of definitions of the term "security" in § 3(a)(10). The Supreme Court has stated that the
two definitions are virtually identical and should be treated as such. Landreth Timber Company
v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985).
135. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
136. Steinberg, supra note 126, at 1116.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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[S]tock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other cate-
gories listed in the Acts' definition.
First, traditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security."... Thus,
persons trading in traditional stock have a high expectation that
their activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made clear
in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify because it lends it-
self to consistent definition. Unlike some instruments, therefore,
traditional stock is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach.
We hold.., that "stock" may be viewed as being in a category by
itself for purposes of interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of
"security., 139
Thus, the Court placed great weight on the reasoning that an in-
strument labeled as stock causes an expectation in the minds of inves-
tors that the investment will be governed by the securities acts. LLC
interests are not denoted "stock." It is also unlikely that LLC inter-
ests have gained enough public recognition as an investment tool to
foster a public expectation that the interests are governed by the se-
curities acts. Therefore, they are not likely to be viewed as "stock"
under federal securities acts."4
Instead, "investment contract" is probably the enumerated cate-
gory most likely to cover LLC interests.141 Although this term is
rather vague, the Supreme Court defined it in SEC v. Howey Co.,142
stating that:
an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
139. Landreth Tmber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 693-94 (1985). See also Reves v. Ernst
and Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990); Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
140. If LLC interests are not considered stock under the Securities Acts, the "sale of busi-
ness doctrine" could result in a denial of security status for a sale of a controlling share of an
LLC. Under this doctrine, a majority of lower courts once held that the sale of all the stock in a
corporation did not constitute the sale of a security since the purchaser would not derive his
profits from the efforts of others. In Landreth, the Supreme Court rejected the applicability of
the sale of business doctrine to stock because "stock" is an enumerated class of security. Lan-
dreth, 471 U.S. at 685-87. Unlike stock, LLC interests do not fall under an enumerated security
category. This means that the investment contract test will likely apply, under which security
status is only conferred if profits are derived solely from the efforts of others. A sale of a con-
trolling interest in an LLC gives the investor latent control over the management of the enter-
prise such that profits are not derived "solely from the efforts of others." The Oklahoma LLC
Act requires at least two members to form an LLC. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2004 (West
Supp. 1994). However, an investor could still purchase a share significant enough that profits
would not be derived solely from the efforts of others.
141. See Sargent, supra note 132, at 1096; Keatinge, supra note 73, at 403.
142. Howey, 328 U.S. at 293.
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efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or
by nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the
enterprise. 143
Thus, an investment contract possesses four characteristics: (1) the
investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with the expec-
tation of a profit, and (4) with that profit to be realized through the
efforts of someone other than the investor. 14
a. Investment of Money
The "investment of money" element of Howey requires that the
purchaser contribute some tangible and definite consideration 14 for
his right to take part in the venture.146 Oklahoma LLC interests
should fall within the scope of this language since the LLC is capital-
ized through member contributions of value, including cash, property,
services rendered, notes and other binding obligations. 47 While the
Oklahoma Act does not specifically address the admission of addi-
tional members, presumably leaving the issue to the operating agree-
ment,148 it is probable that the agreement will provide for the
contribution of cash, goods, or services for an interest in the company.
Thus, the acquisition of an interest in an Oklahoma LLC should in-
volve an investment of some tangible and definite consideration
within the meaning of the Howey test.
b. Common Enterprise
The "common enterprise" element of the Howey test requires the
promoter or some third party take positive action to bring about the
promised investor profit.'4 9 There is, however, disagreement among
the federal courts as to whether the proper test requires horizontal
commonality or merely vertical commonality.' 0 Horizontal common-
ality, a pooling of the interests of investors,15' requires a common goal
between investors." 2 Hence, there must be at least two investors to
143. Id. at 298-99.
144. JosEPH C. LONG, 1984 BLUE SKY LAW HANDBOOK § 2.03[2], at 2-15 (1984).
145. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559 (1979).
146. This consideration usually takes the form of cash, but goods and services may also be
sufficient. See Steinberg, supra note 126, at 1107.
147. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2001(4), 2023 (West Supp. 1993).
148. See supra text accompanying note 7.
149. LONG, supra note 144, § 2.03[2][b] at 2-20.
150. Steinberg, supra note 126, at 1108.
151. MARc I. STEiNBERG, UNDERSTANDING SEcURrrms LAW 250 (1989).
152. Steinberg, supra note 126, at 1108.
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satisfy the horizontal common enterprise element. 53 Horizontal com-
monality is sufficient for a finding of common enterprise in all judicial
circuits.15 4  Alternatively, several circuits, including the Tenth,155
merely require vertical commonality. Vertical commonality, which is
the intermingling of promotor and investor interests, requires only
one investor and one promoter advancing a common goal. 6
Oklahoma LLCs should typically meet either of these tests. The
Oklahoma act requires at least two members to form an LLC,157 so
the vertical commonality requirement in the Tenth Circuit 58 should
be satisfied upon organization. Additionally, only in rare instances
would the members of an LLC lack a common business purpose suffi-
cient to meet a horizontal commonality test. 5 9  Therefore, an
Oklahoma LLC should generally be considered a common enterprise
within the meaning of the Howey test.
c. Expectation of Profit
In United Housing Fund v. Forman 6° the Supreme Court held
that the expectation of profits may take two forms: (1) capital appre-
ciation resulting from development of the initial investment; or (2)
participation in earnings resulting from the use of the investor's
funds.' 6 ' Thus, profit is a tangible economic benefit derived from the
increased value of the item invested' 62 or the payment of money for
the use of the investors capital. 63 The court reasoned that in these
cases the investor is attracted solely by the prospect of a return on the
investment.' 64
The typical LLC investor will contribute capital to the enterprise
with the expectation of receiving profit in one of these forms at some
153. See LONG, supra note 144, § 2.03[2][b] at 2-22.
154. Id.
155. McGill v. American Land and Exploration Co., 776 F2d 923, 925-26 (10th Cir. 1985).
156. LONG, supra note 144, § 2.03[2][b] at 2-21.
157. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2004 (West Supp. 1993).
158. McGill, 776 F.2d at 926.
159. Steinberg, supra note 126, at 1108-09; cf. LONG, supra note 144, § 2.02[2][b], at 2-22
(discussing the limited circumstances in which the horizontal commonality requirement acts as a
constraint to a finding of the investment contract element).
160. 321 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
161. Id. at 854-55.
162. The item invested apparently may take the form of property as well as cash as long as
the investor expected the contribution to appreciate. See LONG, supra note 144, § 2.03[2][b], at
2-23; see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2023 (West Supp. 1994) (listing items an LLC member
may contribute in return for an interest, including property).
163. For example, interest or dividend payments. See LONG, supra note 144, § 2.03[2][b], at
2-23.
164. Forman, 321 U.S. at 854-55.
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point in the future. In fact, the Oklahoma Act contemplates the dis-
tribution of profits to members on a pro rata basis.165 Further, some
courts have held that an expectation of tax benefits derived from ini-
tial losses is a sufficient expectation of profits. 6 Hence, most LLC
investors will contribute capital with an expectation of tangible eco-
nomic benefit as required by Forman.
d. Through the Efforts of Others
The final and most problematic element of the Howey test re-
quires that profits be derived soley from the efforts of others.167 The
Ninth Circuit, in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,'6 8 adopted
a liberal interpretation of the efforts of others test.1 69 The court held
that the word "soley" should not be strictly construed. Instead, the
test is whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are
the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.1 70 Thus, the
"solely" requirement was re-interpreted to mean "substantially. ' 171
This interpretation, while not explicitly adopted by the Supreme
Court,172 has been accepted by eight circuits, 73 including the Tenth.174
Thus, to avoid security classification in the Tenth Circuit, an investor
must contribute managerial efforts to the enterprise rather than a
mere showing of physical effort. 75
165. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2025 (West Supp. 1994).
166. MARK A. SARGENT, LimrTED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK 3-17 (1993).
167. Most commentators, in analyzing the LLC interest as a security, have presumed the
foregoing elements would be satisfied and concentrated instead on the final element of the
Howey test. See Sargent, supra note 132, at 1082 (noting that the efforts of others criterion has
been the key question in determining whether interests in general partnerships and limited part-
nerships should be considered securities).
168. 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
169. The "solely" requirement, if literally applied, would exempt many would be securities
from the Securities Acts, allowing promoters to security status by having investors contribute
very modest efforts to the enterprise. See LONG, supra note 144, § 2.03[2][d], at 2-28 to 2-29.
170. Id.
171. See LONG, supra note 149, § 2.03[2][d], at 2-29 to 2-30, 2-32.
172. United Hous. Fund v. Forman, 321 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975) (declining to specify
whether it was adopting the Glen W. Turner approach).
173. Sargent, supra note 132, at 1083.
174. See Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980);
Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1975).
175. See Crowley, 570 F.2d at 877 ("A mechanical application of 'solely' ... runs contrary to
the broad remedial purposes of the Acts and rejects consideration of 'economic reality.' We
agree with [Glenn W. Turner] that the test is 'whether the efforts made by those other than the
investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the
failure or success of the enterprise."').
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The actual operation of the efforts of others test is best illustrated
by its application to general and limited partnership interests. A gen-
eral partnership interest is virtually a per se non-security 76 because
investors typically exercise significant managerial control. 77 Further,
it does not matter whether an investor actually exercises this control
or delegates it to others. 78 The possession of latent control of the
organization is a sufficient showing that the investors are not depen-
dent upon the efforts of others to realize profit. 79
Williamson v. Tucker,"8 however, stands as an important qualifi-
cation to this line of reasoning. The Williamson court, applying an
economic reality test, held that a general partnership is not disposi-
tively insulated from securities treatment.' 8' Rather, the fact that a
partner possesses power may be overcome by a showing of such de-
pendence upon a promoter or third party that the partner could not
exercise meaningful partnership powers. The court provided three
non-exclusive examples of such a situation: (1) an agreement between
the parties leaves so little power in the hands of a partner that the
entity resembles a limited partnership; (2) a partner is so inexperi-
enced in business affairs that he cannot intelligently exercise his part-
nership powers; and (3) a partner is so dependent upon the unique
entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that
he cannot either replace the manager or otherwise exercise his part-
nership powers."s The Tenth Circuit adopted a more restrictive ap-
proach in Banghart v. Hollywood General Partnership, stating that the
primary inquiry is not on actual control and participation but on the
powers possessed by the partners through the operation of the partner-
ship agreement. Presumably then, in the Tenth Circuit, a general part-
ner would have to contractually relinquish all latent control over the
management of the partnership in order to be a protected investor
under the Securities Acts. 83
Limited partnership interests, on the other hand, are generally
considered investment contracts. 84 They are so considered because a
176. Keatinge, supra note 73, at 404.
177. See Steinberg, supra note 126, at 1111.
178. See Sargent, supra note 132, at 1084.
179. Id.
180. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
181. Id. at 422.
182. Id. at 424.
183. Banghart v. Hollywood General Partnership, 902 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1990) (analo-
gizing to Maritan v. Birmingham Properties, 875 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1989)).
184. See Steinberg, supra note 126, at 1110.
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limited partner who exercises too much control loses limited liability
status.185 Further, courts have continued to treat most limited part-
nership interests as securities even though the Revised Uniform Lim-
ited Partnership Act' 86 provides the limited partner with fairly
extensive participation rights.'87
Several cases, however, suggest a qualification to this line of rea-
soning,"' indicating that a limited partnership interest may escape
classification as an investment contract if: (1) the limited partners in
fact exercise substantial control over the limited partnership; and (2)
the number of limited partners is small.'89 The Tenth Circuit, in
Maritan v. Birmingham Properties,9 ' adopted a similar approach,
stating that the economic realities of the transaction determine
whether the investors are in need of the protection of the Securities
Act.19' The court opined that the proper focus of the examination is
the contract, and the retention of real power in the investors is suffi-
cient to show that the interest is not a security.' 92 The court went on
to find that the limited partnership interest did not constitute a secur-
ity because, whether or not exercised, the investor's access to critical
information, his power under the agreement, and his demonstrated
active involvement gave him sufficient control over the ultimate ex-
pectation of profits. As a result, the "efforts of others" prong of the
Howey test was not satisfied and the interest was therefore not a se-
curity.19 The number of limited partners, however, was not discussed
in the opinion. Hence, the number of investors in the scheme may not
be an important factor in the 10th Circuit. 9 4 Rather, it appears that
securities status may be avoided by a showing of substantial control
185. See Sargent, supra note 132, at 1088 (citing the Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 7).
186. REvisED UN . Lnmn-n PAmaRNsEm Acr §§ 301-64,6 U.L.A. Supp. 298 (Supp. 1993).
Oklahoma adopted the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54,
§§ 301-365 (West 1991).
187. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, § 320 (West 1991) provides that limited partners may engage
in several important activities without being deemed to exercise control of the partnership.
These activities include: (1) being an officer, director, or shareholder of a general partner that is
a corporation; (2) bringing a derivative action on behalf of the limited partnership; and (3) vot-
ing on various matters including dissolution, sales of all or substantially all of the assets of the
limited partnership, the admission of partners, and, significantly, "matters related to the business
... not otherwise enumerated." Id.
188. See Sargent, supra note 132, at 1089.
189. Id.
190. 875 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1989).
191. Id. at 1457.
192. ld. at 1458.
193. Id. at 1459.
194. The number of investors is apparently an important factor in some courts' analyses of
securities status. See Sargent, supra note 132, at 1090.
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irrespective of the number of investors. Thus, limited partnership in-
terests essentially carry a rebuttable presumption of security status.
The precedents developed in partnership and limited partnership
cases provide a guide as to how courts will apply the Howey test to
Oklahoma LLC interests. The Oklahoma Limited Liability Company
Act provides for centralized management of the company by manag-
ers who may or may not be members.195 Such managers have the au-
thority to bind the LLC as its agent.196 Thus, an LLC that has not
altered the default provisions of the Oklahoma Act appears to have a
power structure similar to that of a limited partnership. The man-
ager(s) has the sole binding authority to manage the company197 and
to enter into transactions on behalf of the company. 98
Like limited partners, members may also retain certain rights
concerning the management of the business. These rights include the
power to elect managers, to terminate managers without cause,199 and
to approve or disapprove of the dissolution and winding up of the
company, the disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the
company, a merger of the company, and amendments to the articles of
organization or the operating agreement.200 Thus, the company is
managed by managers and the members are vested with limited ap-
proval rights. While these rights are arguably participatory, they are
no greater in breadth than those allowed by the Oklahoma Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ORULPA).2 °' In fact, the
Oklahoma LLC Act appears to draw heavily from ORULPA. Hence,
interests in a LLC governed by the default provisions of the
Oklahoma Act resemble those in a limited partnership and should
generally be treated equally 202 Absent a showing of actual manage-
rial power, these interests should be investment contracts.
195. OIRA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2013 (West Supp. 1994).
196. Id. § 2019.
197. Id. § 2013.
198. See id. § 2019.
199. Id. § 2014.
200. Id. § 2020.
201. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, §§ 301-65 (1991). The ORULPA provides a list of activities
that a limited partner may engage in without participating in the control of the business. Id. at
§ 320 (B). This enumeration appears to encompass all of the powers granted to a default mem-
ber in an Oklahoma LLC and is probably much broader. This assertion is especially compelling
given the broad scope of § 320(B)(6)(j) which enables a limited partner to propose, approve, or
disapprove of any matter related to the business not otherwise enumerated which the partner-
ship agreement states may be subject to such approval or disapproval. Id.
202. Cf. id. at 34 (asserting that LLC's are functionally equivalent to limited partnerships);
compare Steinberg, supra note 126, at 1113 (discussing the Texas LLC Statute, which also pro-
vides for managers to operate the company).
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However, members might take an active role in managing the
business. The articles of organization or operating agreement may
provide for direct member governance, 20 3 and the Oklahoma Act spe-
cifically provides that the members may elect to manage the company
without managers. 2" In such cases, the members are deemed to be
the managers and are subject to all managerial duties and liabilities.20 5
Also, given the broad ability of LLC organizers to alter the default
provisions of the Act,2°6 the members could presumably create for
themselves a supervisory role vested with more responsibility than
that of a default member but with less than that of a default manager.
Thus, the members might resemble a board of directors with the man-
agers assuming officer-like roles 0 7
If the articles of organization or the operating agreement grant
the members this type of actual or latent managerial power, or a mem-
ber has demonstrated active involvement in the management of the
enterprise, the economic realities of the enterprise may dictate that
the member is not deriving his profits substantially from the efforts of
others.20 8  An LLC with direct member management clearly resem-
bles a general partnership. The members are bound to manage the
company with the care an ordinary and prudent person in like circum-
stances would exercise 0 9 and, thus, have at least latent managerial
power in the enterprise. An interest in an LLC of this character
should generally be considered a non-security under federal law.
Finally, there is the possibility of securities status if an investor
has no actual ability to exercise managerial power because the agree-
ment so provides or the member is actually not competent to exercise
that power. 210 Again, the focus is on economic reality, and actual abil-
ity to control the enterprise appears to be the touchstone. -1
203. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2013 (West Supp. 1993). See also id. § 2015.
204. Id. § 2015.
205. Id.
206. For instance, the articles of organization or the operating agreement may state that the
LLC is to be managed by members rather than managers. Id. §§ 2013,2015. See also id. § 2014
(providing that the operating agreement or the articles of organization may vary the provisions
for election and removal of managers).
207. Of course the resemblance is exaggerated since the hypothetical board is composed of
the members rather than being representative of them, but the point is that the members could
presumably adopt a role intermediate to those contemplated by the statute.
208. Maritan v. Birmingham Properties, 875 F.2d 1451, 1452-53 (10th Cir. 1989).
209. OKLA. STAT. ANr., tit. 18, § 2016 (West Supp. 1994).
210. Williamson v. Icker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981). "[Ihe mere fact that an investment
takes the form of a general partnership or joint venture does not inevitably insulate it from the
reach of the federal securities laws." Id. at 422. See also Steinberg, supra note 126, at 1112.
211. Cf. Steinberg, supra note 126, at 1112.
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Although an interest in a member-managed LLC should enjoy a non-
security presumption, the courts exalt substance over form212 and may
find that a particular interest is a security if the agreement does not
provide the member with any managerial power or the member is pre-
vented from exercising that power.
In summary, the application of federal securities laws to an inter-
est in an Oklahoma LLC appears to be an ad hoc analysis.2 13 The
nature of the LLC Act, which gives the members wide latitude to vary
LLC the characteristics, and the vague definition of investment con-
tract in the Securities Act force the LLC organizer to speculate con-
cerning whether a particular LLC interest will be deemed a security.
What comfort there is in precedent is best derived from the treatment
of partnership and limited partnership interests. Thus, the LLC orga-
nizer can obtain the greatest predictability by tailoring the articles of
organization and the operating agreement to resemble one of the two
partnership forms.
2. The Oklahoma Securities Act and Oklahoma LLCs
The Oklahoma Securities Act2 14 essentially tracks the definition
of a security found in the Securities Act of 1933 with several
changes.215 There are two definitions of security in the Oklahoma Se-
curities Act that are of chief importance in determining whether an
interest in an LLC will be treated as a security.21 6 These two alterna-
tives217 are the investment contract and risk capital tests.21 8
Investment contract analysis under the Oklahoma Securities Act
should be identical to the analysis of an investment contract under the
Securities Act of 1933 discussed above. The Oklahoma Securities Act
provides that it should be construed to coordinate its interpretation
and administration with related federal regulations.219 Further, case
law in the state has recognized the Howey test10 as the definition of
an investment contract for the purposes of the Oklahoma Securities
212. Maritan v. Birmingham Properties, 875 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1989).
213. See Steinberg, supra note 126, at 1114-15.
214. OKLA. STAT. ANm. tit. 71, §§ 1-501 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
215. Compare OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(s) (West Supp. 1994) with 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1)
(1988).
216. See Sargent, supra note 132, at 1069. But see Steinberg, supra note 126, at 1105.
217. Sargent, supra note 132 at 1093.
218. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 2(s)(11), (16) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993).
219. Id. § 501.
220. SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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Act.221 Thus, any LLC interest that is an investment contract under
federal law is an investment contract under the Oklahoma Securities
Act.2 2 Alternatively, the risk capital test is different than the defini-
tion of an investment contract. Oklahoma's risk capital test2 states
that a security includes "investment of money or money's worth in-
eluding goods furnished and/or services performed in the risk capital
of a venture with the expectation of some benefit to the investor
where the investor has no direct control over the investment or policy
decision of the venture." 4  However, in State v. Petco Oil and Gas
the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that the risk capital test is, "with
some modifications, a codification of the definition of an investment
contract used ... in SEC v. Howey Co.."..."225 Courts seem to use
the risk capital test somewhat interchangeably with the Howey test.226
Some elements of the tests are very similar. First, the investment
of money element is very similar to the Howey investment concept.227
Second, the element of lack of direct control over the investment and
policy decisions of the venture is similar to the liberalized Glenn W.
Turner2' s version of the Howey efforts of others element. This view is
especially compelling in Oklahoma since the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals recently stated that the proper test of Howey is
"substantially" through the efforts of others rather than "solely." 229
On the other hand, the tests differ in that the risk capital test
speaks in terms of the expectation of a benefit rather than profit.230
221. See Probst v. State, 807 P.2d 279, 284 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); Howell v. Ballard, 801
P.2d 127, 128 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990).
222. Further, an investment contract that would be exempted from the application of federal
securities law by operation of the exemption for securities sold only to persons resident in a
single state will still be subject to the blue sky laws of the State of Oklahoma. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(11) (1988).
223. Several states have risk capital tests that differ from Oklahoma's. Further, some states
have adopted the risk capital test as an alternative means of defining an investment contract
while Oklahoma has adopted the test as an independent means of defining a security. See Sar-
gent, supra note 132, at 1092-93.
224. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § (2)(s)(16) (Supp. 1994).
225. State v. Petco Oil & Gas, Inc., 558 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Okla. 1977).
226. See, eg., Probst v. State, 807 P.2d 279 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); Armstrong v. State, 811
P.2d 593 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); Howell v. Ballard, 801 P.2d 127 (Okla. App. 1990). However,
commentators have compared the two tests in more detail. See, eg., Sargent, supra note 132, at
1094; LONG, supra note 144, § 2.03[3], at 2-40 to 2-41.
227. "The concept of investment in this regard is identical to the concept of investment de-
veloped previously under the Howey test." LONG, supra note 144, § 2.03[3] at 2-40.
228. SEC v. Glenn W. Tbrner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,482 (9th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973).
229. Probst v. State, 807 P.2d 279, 285 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). The Turner view has like-
wise been adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Crowley v. Montgomery Ward and Co., Inc., 570 F.2d
875, 877 (10th Cir. 1975).
230. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § (2)(s)(16) (West Supp. 1994).
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The benefit can be non-monetary and tangible or intangible as long as
it is the motivation for the investment3 1 While this is a departure
from Howey, the expanded concept of benefit should not be a change
of great magnitude since only rarely will an investor expect a return
that will not fit within the definition of profits. 32
The requirement of an investment in the risk capital of the ven-
ture also differs from the Howey test and is much vaguer than the
other elements. The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that the subjec-
tion of an investor's money to the risks of a venture constitutes risk
capital,233 but whether the investors must have only residual rights to
the invested capital is unclear. At least one commentator believes
that the definition should include debt and equity financing as well as
membership payments and some franchise fees.3 4 Realistically, how-
ever, a membership interest in an LLC should usually be an equity
investment that is not collateralized and hence subject to the risks of
the enterprise.35
Another difference is that the risk capital test does not include a
commonality requirement. Since the Oklahoma investment contract
test only requires vertical commonality, however, this change is un-
likely to have any effect on LLC's. As a practical matter, an LLC
investor should generally share a common business purpose with the
promoter such that an interest would be covered by the vertical com-
monality requirement.
Finally, a potential difference between these tests is indicated by
the Tenth Circuit's consideration of the risk capital test in Meyer v.
Dans un Jardin, S.A. 6 There, the court stated that under the risk
capital test a security is present whenever the investor's funds provide
the initial or venture capital needed to develop a new enterprise.237
Under this view, the membership interest might not be considered risk
capital if the interest is not obtained through initial capitalization.3 s
231. LONG, supra note 144, § 2.03[3] at 2-40 (providing examples of such schemes including
advance hotel reservations, vacation licenses, and condominium time sharing agreements).
232. See Sargent, supra note 132, at 1094.
233. State ex reL Day v. Petco Oil and Gas, Inc., 558 P.2d 1163, 1167 (Okla. 1977).
234. See LONG, supra note 144, § 2.03[3] at 2-40.
235. Cf. SARGENT, supra note 135, at 3-14.
236. 816 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1987).
237. ld. at 536 (rejecting the application of the risk capital test to a federal securities claim to
the extent the tests differed).
238. Id. at 536; compare SARGENT supra note 135, at 3-14.
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Some other jurisdictions have taken this limited view of the risk capi-
tal definition as well. 9 Once again, the question is probably aca-
demic when applied to Oklahoma LLCs since an interest that does not
stem from initial capitalization is still subject to investment contract
analysis. Practically, the LLC member who contributes capital after
the initiation of the venture will have his investment considered under
the investment contract definition.m° Therefore, in most cases, the
risk capital test should be interchangeable with the investment con-
tract test. Only in rare cases will the risk capital test reach LLC inter-
ests that the investment contract test will not.
In summary, investors should find the Howey precedents to be
their best guide in determining the applicability of state and federal
securities laws. The LLC member in Oklahoma should be able to pre-
dict the application of securities laws by tailoring the structure of the
enterprise to one of the two partnership forms discussed.
IV. CONCLUSION
LLCs are becoming extremely popular because they bestow pass
through tax treatment while providing limited liability to all members
and relieving the burden of many corporate formalities. In the initial
analysis this interest is tax driven, but the LLC organizer must be
careful to structure and manage his business so that liability is not
incurred under the securities laws or the doctrine of veil piercing.
Weighing these concerns and plotting a safe course may seem difficult
given the current paucity of precedent. The careful LLC organizer,
however, should be able to reap the rewards of this versatile business
structure without subjecting the business or its members to liability.
Stacy Ward Wood
John Tristam Woodruff
239. See, eg., State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc., 482 P.2d 549, 555 (Or. Ct.
App. 1971); In re let Set Travel Club, [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 1
71,175 (Or. Corp. Comm'n Oct. 28, 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 P.2d 109 (Or. Ct. App.
1975).
240. Some support for this assertion is found by the author's inability to find any Oklahoma
case other than State ex rel. Day v. Petco Oil & Gas, 558 P.2d 1163 (Okla. 1977) which applies
the risk capital definition.
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